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Flock Safety Watches Everyone. Your Police Blotter Is Missing.

Police departments in 5,000+ communities scan millions of license plates every day. A single query reaches 83,000 cameras nationwide — no warrant required. The same departments that won't publish a daily crime spreadsheet are calling FOIA requests an act of terrorism.

📅 May 19, 2026·⏱ 14 min read·By SpotCrime

In Dunwoody, Georgia, Flock Safety employees watched live footage of children in a gymnastics room — not to investigate a crime, but to pitch a sales demo. In Waterford, Michigan, the police chief who defends a secret surveillance network keeps the policy governing that network locked behind a FOIA request. Nationwide, the company enabling this infrastructure calls the citizens who map its cameras “terrorists.” This is what one-way surveillance looks like.

The Camera in the Gymnastics Room

In the summer and fall of 2025, Flock Safety employees accessed live and recorded surveillance feeds at the Marcus Jewish Community Center in Dunwoody, Georgia. The cameras they pulled up were not street cameras. They were labeled “Gym Mendel – 1,” “Main Pool Right,” and “Gymnastics.” Children were present in each location.

This was not a security incident or a rogue employee. It was standard practice. Flock has vendor-level access to camera networks it installs for client cities and institutions — and it used that access as a sales tool, showing prospective clients what the cameras could see. Children doing gymnastics were the product demonstration.

In total, 8 Flock employees accessed Dunwoody's camera network more than 480 times. Feeds accessed included gymnastics rooms, pools, parks, playgrounds, and libraries. No parent was notified. No city official flagged it. The practice was discovered only because Dunwoody resident Jason Hunyar filed a public records request for Flock's access logs — an act of routine civic transparency — and then published what he found.

The Access Log, By the Numbers

480+
Flock vendor accesses to Dunwoody cameras
8
Flock employees who accessed the feeds
0
Parents notified before or after
0
Crimes being investigated

When the story broke publicly in April 2026, Dunwoody residents packed nearly three hours of city council meetings demanding answers. Flock confirmed the access happened and agreed, after the fact, to stop using Dunwoody's cameras for demos. Mayor Lynn Deutsch expressed frustration. The council renewed the Flock contract anyway.

Surveillance Flows One Direction

The Dunwoody incident is not the story of a company that did something wrong once. It is the story of what happens when surveillance infrastructure is built with no enforceable accountability on either end — no meaningful limits on who can access the cameras, and no meaningful obligation to share what those cameras reveal with the public paying for them.

Here is the structural asymmetry at the center of every Flock deployment in America:

What police can do
  • Log every vehicle passing every camera, 24/7, permanently
  • Query 83,000+ cameras nationwide with a single search, no warrant required
  • Build complete movement histories for any vehicle in the database
  • Share data informally with ICE and federal agencies without formal agreements
  • Run discriminatory searches targeting people by ethnicity or political activity
What residents can do
  • File a FOIA request (Flock coaches police on how to deny it)
  • View a “transparency portal” that shows only date, camera name, and a dropdown reason
  • Ask for the department's Flock usage policy (not publicly available)
  • Request a basic daily crime log (often refused as too burdensome)
  • Map camera locations publicly (Flock CEO calls this “terroristic”)

This is the architecture of a one-way mirror. The government sees everything. The public sees an officially approved dropdown menu and a glossy portal that Flock's own staff, in internal communications, called useless.

Waterford, Michigan: The Audit in Plain Sight

Waterford Township, Michigan offers a model case study in how this asymmetry plays out at the local level.

Police Chief Scott Underwood has overseen the expansion of Flock Safety cameras in Waterford to 12 cameras as of early 2026, with plans on record to add four more and deploy Flock-powered surveillance drones. The three-year contract costs $20,000 per year — funded through the department's federal drug forfeiture account, meaning it bypassed normal budget appropriation and public vote.

When residents raised concerns about how the data could be used — specifically whether it could facilitate immigration enforcement — Chief Underwood called those concerns “misinformation, inaccuracies and speculation.” He said officers have an internal policy governing when they can share license plate reader data.

That policy is not available to the public. A FOIA request was required just to learn it exists.

The Waterford Equation

Waterford Township funds a surveillance network that continuously logs the movements of every vehicle driven by its 72,000 residents — and plans to expand it with drones. The policy governing how that data can be used is a secret document. To obtain it, a resident must file legal paperwork, potentially pay processing fees, wait weeks for a response, and potentially fight exemption claims. The same department that cannot produce that policy in five minutes cannot be relied upon to produce a basic daily incident log. The cost of the surveillance system: $60,000 over three years, funded without a public vote. The cost of basic transparency: apparently incalculable.

This is not a knock on Waterford Township specifically. Versions of this dynamic play out in thousands of communities across the country. The pattern is consistent: police departments adopt Flock cameras quickly, often via forfeiture funds or grants that avoid public scrutiny, and then resist any meaningful transparency about how the technology is used — while simultaneously resisting basic proactive crime data disclosure.

Ask for surveillance: approved, funded, deployed. Ask for a daily spreadsheet of what the police did: too burdensome, too sensitive, too complex.

Bidirectional Transparency Is Not a Radical Idea

The principle of bidirectional transparency is straightforward: if government agencies can surveil the public, the public must have a meaningful, systematic ability to monitor the government in return. This is not about turning civilians into counterintelligence operatives. It is about basic democratic reciprocity.

For police departments operating Flock networks, bidirectional transparency would look like this:

Published usage policy
The rules governing who can query the system, for what purposes, and under what authorization — published proactively, not buried behind FOIA requests.
Meaningful audit logs
Every search logged with officer identity, justification, and outcome — available to the public in aggregate, with appropriate redactions for active investigations.
Vendor access disclosure
Every time a vendor employee accesses community camera feeds, that access is automatically logged and disclosed to the municipality and available on request.
Daily incident data
The same department operating a 24/7 surveillance network publishes a daily log of what its officers responded to — the basic police blotter that has been a tool of civic transparency for over a century.
Annual public reporting
How many searches were run. How many resulted in arrests. How many were flagged as outside policy. What the system cost. Published on a defined schedule, in machine-readable format.

None of these are technically difficult. A dispatcher with a spreadsheet can produce a daily incident log. Audit logging is a standard software feature. Vendor access controls are table-stakes enterprise security. The 2015 White House Open Police Data Initiative called for proactive, machine-readable crime data publication from every local jurisdiction. That standard has been largely ignored.

The argument that publishing usage data would compromise officer safety or active investigations is real but narrow. It justifies redacting case-specific details, not eliminating the audit trail entirely. It is the same argument used to justify taking down LAPD's crime map — which San Francisco proved was unnecessary by publishing daily data throughout the same technical transition.

FOIA Requests as Terrorism: The Flock Safety Doctrine

In 2024, a Colorado organizer named Will Freeman built DeFlock.me — a crowdsourced, open-source map of Flock Safety camera locations, submitted voluntarily by members of the public who spotted cameras in their communities. The project's stated mission: promote transparency about the surveillance infrastructure being built in American neighborhoods without public debate.

Flock Safety CEO Garrett Langley's response was to call DeFlock “a terroristic organization” and compare it to Antifa. Flock sent a cease and desist letter. The cameras being mapped are installed on public streets, funded with public dollars, operated by public agencies. The act of noting their locations — information visible to any pedestrian — was characterized by the CEO of a $3.5 billion company as terrorism.

“Closer to Antifa than anything else.”

— Flock Safety CEO Garrett Langley, describing citizens who map public surveillance cameras

The camera-mapping controversy is not isolated. Flock has built an entire infrastructure for suppressing transparency requests. Investigative outlet Footnote4a obtained and published what it called “Flock vs. FOIA: The Suppression Manual”— a Flock-authored document titled “Guide to Flock Safety Data for Open Records Law,” last updated September 2025. The document opens by advising police departments: you do not have to create records.

Flock — a private company — is writing the legal guidance that government agencies use to deny their own constituents access to public records. The transparency portal Flock sells to every client as a sign of civic accountability? In December 2025, Flock stripped officer names, queried license plates, and vehicle fingerprint data from audit logs. What remains: a date, a camera name, and a drop-down reason field with Flock's own pre-approved menu options.

What Flock's “Transparency Portal” Shows

Before December 2025
  • Officer name
  • License plate queried
  • Vehicle fingerprint data
  • Search justification (free text)
After December 2025
  • Officer name — removed
  • License plate queried — removed
  • Vehicle fingerprint — removed
  • Reason: now a Flock-curated dropdown

Flock's own staff, in internal communications, acknowledged the portal provides nothing meaningful to the public.

When researcher Cris van Pelt built HaveIBeenFlocked.com — a site that published Flock audit logs obtained legitimately through public records requests that police departments had failed to redact — Flock went after his web hosts. The company claimed the site posed “an immediate threat to public safety and exposes law enforcement officers to danger.”

The data van Pelt published was the data that exposed a Milwaukee police officer allegedly using Flock's system to stalk a woman. The victim discovered the surveillance only because she checked her plate on HaveIBeenFlocked. Flock's response was to attempt to take down the site that told her.

What Happens Without Accountability: A Pattern

The Electronic Frontier Foundation spent 2025 systematically documenting what Flock's surveillance network looks like without meaningful oversight. The findings span every category of civil liberties concern.

Immigration enforcement

Despite having no formal agreement with ICE, EFF found 4,000+ nation and statewide lookups by local police done as informal favors to federal immigration enforcement. A DEA agent used a Louisville detective's login credentials to run 150 immigration-related Flock searches — without the detective's knowledge.

Reproductive healthcare

Texas deputies ran Flock queries described as a missing person search. EFF revealed it was an abortion investigation. A single Flock query reaches 83,000+ cameras nationwide — no warrant, no judicial review, minimal oversight.

Discriminatory targeting

80+ agencies used searches targeting Romani people using racial slurs. Hundreds of searches with no associated crime were logged. EFF also documented surveillance of protesters exercising First Amendment rights.

Stalking by officers

The Institute for Justice identified at least 14 recent cases of police using Flock and other ALPR systems to stalk wives, girlfriends, exes, and strangers. Victims typically discovered the surveillance through public records sites, not police disclosure.

Secret statewide access

One city discovered a 'statewide lookup' feature had been silently active on 29 of its 30 cameras since initial installation — running for 17 consecutive months. In that time, 250+ agencies that had never signed any data agreement ran an estimated 600,000 searches of that city's cameras. The city was never told.

Cities Are Starting to Push Back

In early 2026, Lynnwood, Washington became the first city to unanimously cancel its Flock Safety contract, citing privacy concerns and immigration enforcement risk. Renton, Washington suspended its cameras twice — the second time in May 2026 — after public outcry, with council members questioning whether alternatives to Flock exist. NPR documented a growing wave of cancellations as the scope of unauthorized data sharing and secret statewide lookups has become public knowledge.

Michigan's state legislature introduced a bipartisan bill to regulate license plate reader use statewide — a direct response to the proliferation of Flock cameras and the absence of any standard governing how data can be used, retained, or shared.

A Washington state court ruled in November 2025 that data captured by Flock Safety cameras are public records — a decision directly at odds with Flock's campaign to keep that data exempt from disclosure.

The Question Every City Council Must Answer

SpotCrime's mission is to make crime data accessible to the public — the same public that is the nominal beneficiary of every Flock deployment. We work directly with thousands of law enforcement agencies to normalize and publish incident data. We know what it costs to produce a daily crime log. It is not expensive. It does not require special technology. It requires the political will to treat the public as a partner rather than a subject.

The argument that police surveillance technology protects communities carries real weight in some contexts. But that argument collapses entirely when the same agencies deploying mass surveillance systems refuse to tell those communities what they responded to yesterday — and when the company enabling that surveillance calls citizens who ask questions terrorists.

If your police department believes the public's movements are an appropriate subject of permanent government surveillance — every vehicle, every road, every hour — then the public has an equivalent right to know, in real time, how that data is used. And it can start by producing a daily spreadsheet of its own activities to demonstrate it has nothing to hide.

Bidirectional transparency is not a favor. It is the condition under which surveillance power is legitimate. A department that claims to surveil residents for their own protection, while simultaneously resisting every mechanism by which those residents could verify that claim, is not a partner. It is a one-way mirror in a room that used to be public.

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